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Near East/South Asia Report



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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Paris Magazine Comments on Shanudah Reinstatement (Ghassan al-Imam; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Jan 85).....	1
Saudi-Yemeni Coordination Council Meets (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 4-10 Jan 84).....	3

ARAB AFRICA

MAURITANIA

1983 Trade and Development Bank Report Noted (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, No 2042, 28 Dec 84).....	4
---	---

MOROCCO

1985 Defense Budget Adopted (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, No 2042, 28 Dec 84).....	6
Country's Financial Status Reviewed (JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE, No 53-54, Dec 84-Jan 85).....	7

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

ISRAEL

Arab Citizens' Identity Problems Analyzed (Moshe Gabai; NEW OUTLOOK, Oct/Nov 84).....	10
--	----

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Professor Discusses Arab Citizens' Political Positions
(Sammy Smooha Interview; NEW OUTLOOK, Oct/Nov 84)..... 17

Population Statistics Given for Arab Inhabitants
(Avraham Cohen; NEW OUTLOOK, Oct/Nov 84)..... 23

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Karim Khalaf Discusses Palestinian Split
(Karim Khalaf Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
14-20 Dec 84)..... 28

SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

Soviets Count on Time, Latitude To Bring Down Resistance
(Jean-Pierre Perrin; L'EXPRESS, 4-10 Jan 85)..... 33

IRAN

Efforts Exerted by Regime for Rapprochement With USSR
(FOREIGN REPORT, 25 Jan 85)..... 36

Regime Plans To Levy Taxes Despire Bazaar's Opposition
(FOREIGN REPORT, 25 Jan 85)..... 38

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

PARIS MAGAZINE COMMENTS ON SHANUDAH REINSTATEMENT

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Jan 85 p 3

[Editorial by Ghassan al-Imam]

[Text] In a time of Arab defeat, suppressed desires awaken and feelings and traditions slumbering for centuries stir in the depth of the souls. In a time of Arab decline, partition becomes national independence for which holidays and decorations are organized.

In a time of Arab frustration, God becomes a symbol of unified and unifying unity, a god for every sect and a lord for every religion, an inspirer for every regime, and an intercessor for everyone who carries an axe with which to strike the lifeless and torn body.

Egypt is a homogeneous and harmonious mass of humanity enduring psychologically, historically, and religiously in the middle of this delicate Arab mosaic.

The Copts bore weapons side by side with the Muslims to defend Egypt against the Crusader's aggressions.

The Copts plunged into the national struggle against colonialism under the banner of the Wafd in the 20th century.

The Copts paid a blood tax in all the armed conflicts between the Arabs and the Zionists to defend the Arabdom of the Palestinians. Pope Shanudah fought in Palestine and he waged war in defense of the land of Egypt. It was noble of him to have fought and struggled with the same strength and zeal to achieve a unified Egypt for the Copts and the Muslims.

Perhaps there was some excuse for him when he saw the ruler at times inflame religious emotions for political purposes.

However, while a politician is allowed to sin out of desire for the pomp of this world, a clergyman may not commit the same sin out of fear of a reckoning in the next world.

It is difficult for a politician and a clergyman to hide under one cloak, no matter how splendid, awe-inspiring, wonderful, and roomy it may be.

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Christ said one day, "Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's."

Pope Shanudah has given very much in the last 3 years in his isolation in the monastery of Wadi al-Natrun.

Isolation provides time for thought. Perhaps in returning to perform his duties Pope Shanudah has emerged from his isolation with an appeal for unity and spiritual harmony between the two sides of Egypt.

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

SAUDI-YEMENI COORDINATION COUNCIL MEETS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Jan 84 p 48

[Text] The Saudi-Yemeni coordination council has undertaken a general review of past stages in the completion of projects supported by Saudi Arabia in the Yemen Arab Republic. A Yemeni ministerial delegation visited Riyadh recently to meet with senior Saudi officials and to study what has been accomplished. Yemen seems to have made big strides in all economic fields because of the efforts by the council for cooperation between the two countries.

In the field of cable and wireless communications, Yemen has been able to set up direct communications between the larger Yemeni cities and a number of others, and the number of telephones has now reached 100,000. In Yemen there are now two ground stations for communications by way of two international satellites, one of which is above the Indian Ocean and the other is above the Atlantic Ocean. There is a regional project covering international communications between the two Yemens, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Also, telephone communications between Yemen and Saudi Arabia have reached the level of 2 million calls a month.

In the field of roads, the coordination council decided to implement three road projects on which work was recently completed. The first one links the cities of Dhamar, Rida', and al-Bayda'. The second one links the city of Sa'dah to the town of Baqim, and the third links the city of al-Hudaydah on the Red Sea coast to the town of al-Tiwal in Saudi Arabia. Also, a ring road in the city of Sanaa has been completed.

In the field of public utilities, the Saudi Development Fund undertook the financing of the first stage of a sewer project for the capital and the major portion of water and sewer projects for the city of Ta'izz.

In the field of civil aviation and airlines, in Yemen there are now three main airports, in Sanaa, al-Hudaydah, and Ta'izz, in addition to domestic airports for the landing of small airplanes. An expansion project at Sanaa airport has been opened, which has enabled the airport to make room for 18 jumbo jets instead of 8, and Saudi Arabia has contributed 49 percent of the Yemeni airlines' capital.

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MAURITANIA

1983 TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BANK REPORT NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 2042, 28 Dec 84 p 3258

[Text] Mauritania's economy was characterized in 1983 by a slight drop in iron ore exports (7.4 million tons valued at 7.2 billion ouguiyas), a strong increase in controlled exports of fish (312,000 tons with 52 percent of purchases by the Soviet Union), a worsening of the trade balance deficit (increasing from 1.5 to 1.7 billion ouguiyas), and by a reduction of the budget deficit (down to 2 billion ouguiyas).

In this context, the Mauritanian Bank for Development and Trade (BMDC) continued the efforts it began in 1982 to reorganize its commitments, diversified its operations, and increased its share of the market in deposit receipts and the distribution of credit. Its balance sheet as of 31 December 1983 came to 2.7 billion ouguiyas compared with 1.9 billion at the end of 1982, an increase of 40 percent.

The total for client deposits (demand deposit and fixed term accounts of individuals and businesses) came to 1.6 billion ouguiyas, an increase of 49.32 percent over the end of December 1982. The BMDC's share of the volume of resources collected by the banking system thus amounted to 20.69 percent (compared with 15 percent at the end of 1982).

Appropriations represented a total outstanding of 2 billion ouguiyas, an increase of 21.6 percent over December 1982. Of the total funds to the economy distributed by the banks as a whole, the BMDC's share came to 13.34 percent (as against 13 percent at the end of 1982). Credit extended by the BMDC has developed within the framework of the norms established by the Central Bank of Mauritania. Cooperation in particular has developed to the advantage of the fishing sector (+461 percent), crude oil refining (+100 percent), and agricultural production (+73 percent).

Off the balance sheet, commitments by confirmed documentary credits and by securities and guarantees on behalf of clients total 2.1 billion ouguiyas.

The increase in deposits resulted in a reduction in recourse to refinancing by the Issuing Institute (457.1 million ouguiyas). The activities of the foreign banking department showed considerable development with a total of 2 billion ouguiyas in settlements.

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The development section of the BMDC approved the financing of five projects (notably sheet-iron production, manufacture of enameled products, and soap manufacture). The ventures entry recorded 24.6 million ouguiyas in the balance sheet of 31 December 1983.

After amortizations and reserves, the 1983 fiscal period produced a positive result of 15.2 million ouguiyas which the general assembly of 9 August decided to allocate to build up reserves so as to make possible the incorporation of 30 million in reserves available for the increase of capital which will thus expand from 80 to 110 million ouguiyas in 1984.

Bal Moustapha, technical adviser to the Ministry of the Economy and Finances, is the president of the Mauritanian Bank for Development and Trade. Nine other state representatives as well as the Central Bank of Mauritania are members of the board of directors. The general manager is Mohamed Ould Nany.

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MOROCCO

1985 DEFENSE BUDGET ADOPTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 2042, 28 Dec 84 p 3254

[Article: "The Chamber of Representatives Adopts the 1985 Defense Budget"]

[Text] On 22 December, the Moroccan delegates unanimously adopted the national defense budget for the 1985 fiscal year. In communicating the information, the national press agency MAGHREB ARABE PRESSE did not specify the appropriations allocated for the Moroccan armed forces estimated at 4.3 billion dirhams (the same number of French francs) in the 1985 draft budget, currently studied by the Chamber of Representatives. It should be recalled that according to the draft, the state general budget for the same period is estimated at approximately 50 billion dirhams (MTM of 14 December, pp 3054-3055).

Appropriations for Moroccan defense, which increased by 13 percent in this draft by comparison with last year, constitute one of the largest allocations reserved for the Moroccan ministries and come after those for the Department of Education, which reserves approximately 6.1 billion dirhams.

"All those taking part in the vote on the army's budget," the MAP [MAGHREB ARABE PRESSE] observed, "lauded the courage and bravery of the Royal Armed Forces, which are ready for any sacrifice in the defense of the territorial integrity of the kingdom, and the efforts they are making for the realization of basic infrastructures in the Saharan provinces."

The same source noted that during the debates the delegates requested "that the work of the armed forces be supported by diplomatic action providing appropriate information in all international forums."

At the time of the presentation of the 1985 draft budget about a month ago, the Moroccan minister of finance, Abdellatif Jouahri, stated before the parliamentarians that in the preparation of the state budget--which would soon come up for a general vote--the Moroccan government had kept in mind the "imperative necessity of providing the Royal Armed Forces with all human and material resources necessary" for the defense of the country. On this point, the observers noted, all Moroccan political parties were in agreement.

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MOROCCO

COUNTRY'S FINANCIAL STATUS REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE in French No 53-54, Dec 84-Jan 85 p 161

[Text] Nineteen eighty-four, the second year in the financial reorganization confirmed by the austerity budget approved in April, has marked some progress on the road to economic recovery. Testimony to the fact can be seen in the good report from the IMF which authorized Morocco to make an advance deduction of a 40 million SDR [Special Drawing Rights] slice last September, bringing to 170 million the amount obtained since September 1983. Some sectors did well, such as tourism which brought in 1.6 billion dirhams in foreign currency during the first quarter of 1984 compared with 1.2 billion during the same period in 1983. Likewise, the mining sector has experienced a recovery despite the damage caused by the international situation: the effect of the dollar and the doubling of sales of phosphoric acid have enabled exports of phosphates and its derivatives to increase by 30 percent from January to September 1984 by comparison with the same period in 1983. Lead and copper have also registered an upturn through a slight one. Nevertheless, mining operations are far from regaining their 1981 level.

Textile production showed a clear improvement: investments increased by 45 percent, reaching more than 500 million dirhams at the end of the first 9 months of 1984. Textile exports increased by 7.7 percent in volume and by 35.8 percent in value. Heads of businesses stress that the Moroccan economy made better overall progress in 1984 than in 1983. And bankers promise the opening of new lines of credit. One can therefore expect an easing of the situation on the domestic market in 1985, strengthened by the beginning of privatization of the economy, like the liberalization of the sale of canned goods overseas.

The fact remains that the burden of the country's debt is a cause for concern. The amount outstanding is estimated at \$12 billion i.e., 90 percent of the gross national product. Negotiations for the rescheduling of the trade debt (\$500 million) with the London Club creditors continue to come up against the question of the Bank of Morocco's guarantee. A British consulting firm, Richard Butler, was even called in by the Rabat for assistance.

The balance of trade for the first quarter of 1984 shows a deficit of 7.8 billion dirhams, compared with 5.2 billion during the same period of 1983. A further reduction in the cover rate of imports in relation to exports was therefore registered: 53.4 percent in 1984 compared with 56.1 percent in 1983.

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The failure of the export promotion policy (+2.8 percent only, in volume, during the first quarter of 1984) was aggravated by the increase in the food bill. Partly because of the continuing drought, Morocco imports as much wheat as it produces in the country (3 million tons) to meet its consumption level (6 million tons per year). This cost \$500 million in 1984.

Finally, the drop in the production of hydroelectric energy because of the low level of water in the dams increased the dependence of the country on foreign supplies of energy to 80 percent in 1984, with an oil bill of 7 billion dirhams.

Caught between a delicate financial situation on the one hand and social tensions because of the high cost of living (riots at the beginning of 1984) on the other, the Moroccan government has little room to maneuver. The end of the austerity measures will not be tomorrow.

[Boxed Section]


Some Assets All the Same--The State of Affairs

The short term outlook is grim, with the exception of some sectors which register positive results (building, construction materials, leather and textiles, fisheries, canned goods).

The opinion of North-South Export Consultants: "In the best case scenario, Morocco has entered an austerity phase for 2 to 3 years (...) but the Moroccan economy conceals definite potential, illustrated by positive results in several sectors. Various recent reforms (the investment code, foreign trade) tend towards a liberalism which may stimulate the economy (...)."

In addition, the NSE [North-South Export Consultants] warns exporters of delays in payment "which are not due to technical reasons but are the result of a shortage of foreign currency which will remain critical."

The industrial investment code is considered by foreign experts to be the most favorable in French-speaking Africa.



Key:

1. Gross national product
2. Gross national product by inhabitant (1960-1982)
3. Inflation
4. Exports (goods only)
5. Imports
6. Debt Burden (total debt as a percentage of the 1982 gross national product)

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ISRAEL

ARAB CITIZENS' IDENTITY PROBLEMS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Oct/Nov 84 pp 18-23

[Article by Moshe Gabai]

[Text] Moshe Gabai is the director of the Institute for Arabic Studies at Givat Haviva. In the following article, which is excerpted from a longer study of Israeli Arab identity published by Givat Haviva, Gabai examines the different and often contradictory social forces which contribute to Israeli Arabs' sense of identity. He points to problem areas such as integration and radicalization and offers some preliminary recommendations.

The identity of the Israeli Arab constitutes a veritable work of art; it comprises a delicate balancing of contradictory aims, predicated upon the lack of any clear-cut decision. It must somehow come to terms with the disparate phenomena of Arabism, Palestinianism and Israeliness. From an emotional perspective Israeli Arabs were and remain a part of the Arab world, which they perceive as a spiritual homeland — a community with values, customs, traditions, history and culture.

In the last decades the prevalent terminology in the Arab world is "El-Watan El-Khaz" (the homeland of birth) and "El-Watan El-Aam" (the general homeland). There are, however, no people in the Arab world who identify themselves merely as "Arabs". Every Arab is defined from a more limited national perspective — a Syrian Arab, an Iraqi Arab, a Palestinian Arab. Following the Six Day War, the exposure of Israeli Arabs to Palestinianism struck a blow at the third component of their identity, their Israeliness.

Israeliness is apprehended in legal terms and in economic and social achievements. For Arabs, Israelis constitute, in most spheres of life, a "reference group", that is, a group which possesses what they desire to achieve and what, in their opinion, is their due. Furthermore, at least from the intellectual point of view, the educated Arab lives in a conceptual world very similar to that of the Israeli Jew — i.e., modernity.

MODERNIZATION AND INTEGRATION

Following the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab population was diminished and was left without leadership and without political and economic power. Ties with the Arab countries were cut off and government passed into the hands of the Jews. Arab society in Israel suffered not only the trauma of defeat, but the trauma of becoming a minority in a country where they had previously constituted the majority. The realities in Israel contradicted the fundamental assumptions of their traditional

Islamic world view. One of the things that Israeli Arabs vehemently rejected was the very use by state institutions of the concept "minority".

On the other hand, as Yochanan Peres and Nira Davis have pointed out, Israeli Arabs' integration into the process of modernization meant that they came more and more to resemble the surrounding Jewish world: They participated in the Israeli framework of higher education, adopted modern methods of agriculture and medicine, and established professional contacts with their Jewish counterparts. Such phenomena as the reading of the Hebrew press, the addition of Hebrew words into the Arabic language and participation in elections give further testimony to the increased integration of the Arab population into Israeli society. Moreover, the very criterion by which Israeli Arabs have come to assess their situation is the degree of development and achievement of the Jewish population: "It doesn't interest me that we live better than the Arabs in Saudi Arabia and Jordan; I don't look to enquire what they have there, but rather what the kibbutz members across from my village have achieved." (Interview with an assistant school principal in Jaffa, published in *Yediot Achronot*, December 15, 1975.)

The process of modernization entailed a further consequence: diminishment of the need for traditional symbols of identity together with the promotion of nationalist values. The result was that young Israeli Arabs came more and more to resemble Jews at a time when the degree of rejectionism they felt for Israel as a Jewish state was increasing.

The geographical segregation of Arabs and Jews in Israel only increased tensions. The fact is that until just a few

years ago, 90% of all Arabs (excluding those in East Jerusalem) lived completely segregated lives – in two cities (Nazareth and Shfaram), 103 villages and about forty Beduin encampments. The result was almost total school segregation (excluding universities) and the absence of neighborly relations between the two peoples. Furthermore, as the majority

of Arabs do not serve in the armed forces and do not belong to any Israeli social organizations, a *de facto* segregation exists in those frameworks which serve as the most important meeting grounds in Israeli society – not to mention the non-participation of Arabs in an essential facet of Israeli citizenship and the consequent closing of employment opportunities in this area. (While the decision to exempt the Arab population – excluding the Druse – from military service involved a desire to avoid placing them in difficult situations of divided loyalties, the more significant factor was the fear of endangering the security of the army.)

One year after the establishment of the state, the orientalist Michal Assaf published an article entitled "The Process of Integration of the Arabs of the State of Israel". Here he posed the question of whether the young State of Israel would be able to digest the phenomenon of an Arab presence – whether the Arab minority would be integrated into Israeli society. Assaf defined "integration" as "the transformation of Arabs into citizens with an essential minimum of loyalty to the State of Israel." In 1967 Rechavam Amir added two further determinants to the concept of integration: Israeli Arabs must come to terms with 1) their status as a non-assimilated ethnic and cultural (but not national) minority, and 2) with the character of the State of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state with a Jewish majority.

The beginnings of the process of integration came from both the Jewish and Arab sides, although from differing motivations. Israeli Arabs, though they understood the dire consequences of 1948, nevertheless began to express their desire to become a part of Israeli society. In contrast to the nationalist circles that had left the country, those who remained developed a purely pragmatic world view that demanded quick and vigorous integration. Especially satisfied were those whose salaries as skilled, and even non-skilled, workers rose, and

villagers, who gained a large Jewish market for their agricultural produce. Exceptions to this rule were the small groups of communists, mostly in Haifa and Nazareth, who never even considered the issue of integration. For a long while they continued to air their demand that Nazareth and its environs be annexed to an Arab state. Likewise, clerks and laborers, particularly from the north, who had worked in refineries or for various international companies under the Mandatory government, and who found it difficult to find alternate work, refrained to a great extent from the process of integration.

In the Jewish sector, the desire to integrate the Arabs into the state system came from a number of directions, but the prime motivation was political: the desire of the Jewish parties to find Arab support for their Knesset lists at election

time. For its part, the Israeli government emphasized over and over again: "The policy of the Israeli government is aimed at the full integration of the minorities in Israel into all spheres of the state's life while at the same time respecting their religious and cultural individuality." (Government Yearbook 1974).

In the meantime, however, a new generation of young Arab intellectuals, most of them native born, had begun to crystallize and to question the assumptions that characterized the pattern of relations between the Arabs and the state in the first years after its establishment. Regarding themselves as the future generation, they were ready to do battle with the traditional leadership and displayed increasing involvement in all spheres of Israeli Arab society. They recognized the existing societal gaps.

relationship between the Palestinian revolution and Israeli Arabs. For three days these people fought without weapons – with sticks and stones. We hope that they will take measures to overcome this lack." In short, land expropriation in the Galilee was perceived as an inseparable part of the overall Palestinian struggle, a matter concerning not only Israeli Arabs, but the entire Palestinian people.

At this point it is important to stress that the problem posed by Palestinian identity for Israeli Arabs is not merely a psychological-cultural problem which has been kindled by the PLO and the rejectionist front in the Arab states. In addition to deep-seated cultural and historical ties, Israeli Arabs share many family, village and regional ties with other Palestinians. Furthermore, the political world of Israeli Arabs is not limited to the boundaries of the state; they are influenced by overall developments in the Arab world. This includes the recent upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism, a phenomenon which demands serious attention. Fanatic religious groups have appeared which complement, rather than oppose, the nationalist stream. In fact, they strive to emphasize nationalist sentiment while endeavoring to detach it from its secular character. Among Israeli Arabs, a revived Islamic circle was established in Baka El-Gharbiya at the initiative of "Sons of the Village" youth. A "Society for Righteousness and Good Deeds" modelled after the early Islamic missionaries was established in Acre. Their leader, Faiz Kurdi, preaches against coeducational studies. In Kfar Kassa, Abdullah Issa, the advocate of Islamic revival, points to the ray of light shining from the Iranian Islamic Republic.

Despite the above description of the process of *Palestini*zation and radicalization within the Israeli Arab community, it would be irresponsible to generalize about Israeli Arabs and regard them as a radical community. The moderate camp has always demonstrated its power and proved its ability to influence. However, while the moderates are engaged in the attempt to find their way, I suspect that the radicals will be consolidating their strength.

OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

In the 1950's Israeli Arabs lacked both leadership and an intelligentsia.

Their most important urban centers lay outside the border of the State of Israel. Those who remained were mainly villagers of low socio-economic status. Under these conditions, accepted Israeli policy was to demand nothing of Israeli Arabs beyond official adherence to the law and public order. No demands were made upon them for active involvement in the life of the state. It was clear that Israeli Arabs would not be able to identify with the symbols of the state and its collective aims, nor see in it a framework for their collective aspirations.

Today, the fundamental factors which permitted this state of affairs have changed. The demographic revolution which has taken place among Israeli Arabs has provided them with a feeling of strength and a self-image of a broad and influential community.

Education constitutes a most important factor in the changed circumstances. In 1967 there were 605 Israeli Arab university students. Ten years later they numbered 1322, and this year (1984) their numbers have reached 2400. What is happening at the Technion is instructive of trends in the choice of professions. In 1968, forty-two Arab students studied at the Technion; in 1980 there were 222; this year 246 Arab students are enrolled at the Technion. In 1974 only forty-two female Arab students studied at Israeli universities; today there are over 520. In 1981, 170 Arab students studied toward a Masters degree; today their numbers have reached 240.

Furthermore, the face of the Arab village has changed. The percentage of

those supporting themselves from agriculture has dropped significantly. The employed tend to be wage laborers or to work outside the village. In most villages the developmental work of providing water, electricity, roads and schools has been completed. The process of modernization is signified by the changes in lifestyles. Yet instead of decreasing the sources of bitterness, these economic and social achievements have actually reinforced them: the increasing radicalization of Israeli Arabs has come about not in spite of the achievements, but because of them.

For the Arab intellectual, national consciousness is more attractive than a sense of Israeli citizenship. It is precisely the educated urban sector, which is closest to the Jews in its ways of thinking, that is most exposed to the pressures of Palestinian nationalist frameworks. This is a community which strives to express itself and which seeks identity symbols and horizons for activity; it aspires not merely to individual advancement, but to the expression of its collective identity.

Does the Arab minority desire to become integrated within Jewish society? Is the Jewish society prepared to accept this integration? It is impossible to exhaust these questions with simple yes or no answers. To start with, it must be clearly stated that integration does not mean the assimilation of the Arab minority. Neither the Jewish majority nor the government of Israel has any assimilatory aspirations regarding Israeli Arabs. Furthermore, the idea of intentional assimilation contradicts the very essence of that channels of economic integration were closed to Arabs and that the level of industrialization in the Arab private sector was low and its resources scant. Furthermore, in the political arena, most of the Zionist parties other than *Mapam* afforded only partial membership to Arabs. Thus Arab youth increasingly questioned the credibility of the slogan "integration": "I am not against the state, I believe in it; but the state does not provide the Arab citizen with the feeling that he is a part of it." [Omar Ottman, principal of the Abu Ghosh School, as published in *Maariv*, December 25, 1972]

THE ACCELERATING PROCESS OF PALESTINIANIZATION

The initial pride expressed by Israeli Arabs in their material achievements – the sharp rise in the standard of living and the expansion of the educational network – earned them mockery and charges of treason: "You sold your nationalism for a mess of potage. Who are you anyway? What role do you play in the life of the Arab nation? What is

your contribution to Arab affairs?" (Abdul Aziz Zuabi, "Israeli Arabs in the Dilemma of Dual Loyalty", *Maalot*, January 1971, p. 30)

The question of their national identity became increasingly problematic for Israeli Arabs; their inferior status as "those lacking in identity" became more pronounced during the period following the Six Day War. The renewed encounter with West Bank inhabitants exposed Israeli Arabs to the influences of a population characterized by a developed Palestinian awareness and national consciousness. They witnessed such institutions as the Supreme Moslem Council in Jerusalem and the National Guidance Committee, as well as acts of civil struggle, including strikes and demonstrations. For the first time in their lives many Israeli Arabs were faced with the problem of defining their identity: Were they Israelis? Arabs? Palestinians? Palestinian residents of Israel? Israeli-Palestinians? Who were they?

In 1981 a television program was dedicated to the village of Brata in the northern Triangle, a village which had been split in two by the 1949 armistice lines and whose inhabitants had lived on both sides of the border for eighteen years. Fourteen years after the reunification of the village the Israeli inhabitants

explained that they felt a difference between themselves and their "Jordanian" neighbors. One of the village youth stated that when he visited Nablus he felt like an Israeli but when he visited Tel Aviv he felt like an Arab.

The complex and delicate balance in the structure of Israeli Arab identity was being undermined. In addition, the failures of many of the Arab states struck at the very foundations of some future hope regarding their situation — a hope which in the past had helped to stabilize the situation. As the identity crisis of Israeli Arabs deepened, the gap between the pragmatists and the nationalists grew wider, while the extreme nationalist trend increased in strength. Many Israeli Arabs stood before a parting of the ways:

1. Minority status in a Jewish state. One possible solution was to accept the status of minority, either by attempting to improve the condition of the minority through political struggle, or by abandoning the political arena and concentrating on the spheres of individual and family.
2. Strengthening of ties with the Arab world.
3. Palestinianism. As we have noted, this development of a latent tendency within Israeli Arab identity surfaced with the new West Bank connection and an overall disappointment with the Arab world. (In reality, however, Palestinian attachment grew simultaneously with a feeling of belonging to the Arab world: Witness the events following the death of Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser in September 1970. Thousands

participated in the symbolic funerals which were held in the Triangle and Galilee villages. Wooden caskets symbolically covered with black sheets were carried in demonstrative mourning processions accompanied by shouts of: "Nasser, Nasser, rest in peace; we shall continue the struggle.")

RADICALIZATION AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE

The Yom Kippur War gave Israeli Arabs a new sense of pride. The journalist, Attalah Mansour, declared: "The word 'Arab' has ceased to be a dirty word." Toufik Ziad, the mayor of Nazareth, expressed the spirit of exaltation that swept Israeli Arabs after the war in a poem:

The world is no longer the same world
And all those fables and theories
About the superior people and the inferior
people
Collapsed — in half a day

Before 1973 Palestinian identification had been characterized by a reinforced historic-cultural consciousness. The rise of the PLO in inter-Arab and international circles as a recognized and well-defined organization claiming to represent the Palestinian people came to be reflected in Israeli Arab attitudes as well: "The PLO is the representative of all the

Palestinians and therefore also my representative; but as I live under Israeli rule, the PLO does not technically represent me." (Interview with student Issa Kay-sar, published in *Yediot Achronot*, November 29, 1974)

Though not a widespread phenomenon, 350 Israeli Arabs joined PLO ranks between 1967 and 1973, including ten of high intellectual stature. Among these were the lawyer, Tzabri Jiyris, a Hebrew University graduate who acted as senior researcher at the Center for Palestinian Studies in Beirut; the poet Habib Kahoji, who was employed by Syrian intelligence; Razi Daniel, another Hebrew University graduate who left Israel in 1970 and acted as deputy director of the Center for Palestinian Studies in Beirut; Mahmoud Darwish, a former *Rakah* member who deserted to Egypt when he was on a *Rakah* mission to Moscow in 1971; and Elias Shofani of Me'ilya, a Hebrew University graduate and employee of the Center for Palestinian Studies.

Already in 1971 the PLO decided to add three of these Israeli Arabs – Tzabri Jiyris, Habib Kahoji and Mahmoud Darwish – to the Palestine National Council, in order to represent "the Arabs of Palestine who have lived under occupation since 1948." A year later in 1972, at the tenth convention of the Palestine National Council in Cairo, a decision was taken expressing support for the struggle of Israeli Arabs: "...attention to the condition of our citizens in the territories conquered in 1948 and support for their struggle in order to preserve their national and Arab identity – adopting their problems and helping them to unite in the struggle for liberation."

PLO broadcasts gave high priority to instilling in the Arab population of Israel a sense of Palestinian belonging, emphasizing the identity of interests that united them with West Bank Arabs and the Palestinian diaspora throughout the world. The broadcasts nurtured the idea of separation from Israel, claiming that the areas of the Galilee and the Triangle contained an absolute Arab majority and were thus Israeli on the map only.

Israeli Arabs began to organize for political protest and they developed a series of national frameworks: Arab students committees in every institution of higher education, a national committee of secondary school students, the Committee of Academics and Intellectuals in Nazareth, the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils and the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Lands (the latter acting

vigorously against the program of expropriation of Arab lands in the Galilee).

The question of lands had been a sensitive bone of contention between the Arab minority and the Jewish state since 1948. In a national protest convention which took place in Nazareth on March 16, 1976 it was decided to fix the date of March 30th for a general strike and a popular demonstration. The following announcement was published: "As an expression of the genuine anger that rages in the soul of our people against a policy which aims at uprooting us from every last bit of the land in our possession [...] We call upon the Arab inhabitants of Israel to announce a general strike on March 30th and to make this day 'Land Day' in Israel – a day in which the Arab masses will raise their voices in the demand to put an end to the official policy that has become a threat to our future in this country [...] We are a people who have been struggling with a tragedy of dispossession that has continued these thirty years."

During the general strike which took place on March 30, 1976 there were skirmishes between Arab demonstrators and police forces; six Arab villagers from the Galilee were killed and tens were wounded, among them soldiers and policemen. (According to *Ha'aretz* of April 9, 1976, the strike encompassed 75% of all Israeli Arabs.)

Land Day received wide coverage in the PLO organ, *Shuon Palestina*, which published a symposium on "the great uprising" in which Elias Shofani elaborated upon the significance of the Palestinian struggle among Israeli Arabs: "The uprising of the Galilee Arabs placed them upon the political map – in the

first place on the Palestinian map and subsequently on the Arab and world maps. From now on it will be impossible to overlook these outcasts, these forgotten ones; there can be no doubt that their uprising will receive expression in the very structure of the Palestinian revolution – its purposes, its paths and its future. [...] It will also influence the

Jewish existence. Moreover, in the last analysis, the Arab minority is not capable of assimilation; from the point of view of history, religion and language, it cannot be cut off from the Arab surroundings.

Given this state of affairs, I would like to conclude with some observations and suggestions for the creative, non-assimilationist integration of the Arab community within Israeli society:

* A sympathetic approach to national education. The problem of finding the proper balance of educational values in a state containing a majority and a minority is complex. The educational system must provide the children of the national minority with everything necessary for their advancement in a society where the formation of culture is determined by the majority. On the other hand, it must provide the minority with the means to develop their particular national identity. Withholding the means for sufficient expression of national aspirations does not eliminate these aspirations. The Arab student who does not find an answer to his needs in the school, is liable to seek and to find

Arabs from being appointed deputy ministers in the ministries of education, religions, agriculture and the interior. Likewise, Israeli Arabs should take part in Israeli delegations to international organizations and should be appointed consuls.

Finally, let me return once again to the problem of the lack of integrated social frameworks. The cultural and social differentiation between Arabs and

inspirational and political guidance from other, non-educational, sources such as radical organizations, newspapers and pamphlets. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the Israeli educational system not to surrender its ability and power in the struggle over the identity of Arab youth educated in Israel.

* Public office and the Arab intelligentsia. Israeli Arabs are under-represented in public office (taking the term in its widest sense). Today, Israeli Arabs participate in instruction in Arab schools, in local government, clerical work and the police. There is no good reason why they should not be integrated within the Hebrew schools, the network of higher education and the judicial system. There should be nothing to prevent Israeli

Jews has become institutionalized. To this very day there are no integrated or common frameworks. The basis of Arab identity, from the point of view of ethnic origin, language, religion and nationalism, guarantees a separate Arab existence – the concentration of Arab populations in specific territorial enclaves and separate institutions such as schools, media and voluntary organizations. All this hinders the creation of an overall Israeli culture and identity, and common social frameworks.

Given these conditions, the issue of the policy lines to be taken *vis à vis* the Arab minority is both grave and complex. Yet we lack a clear-cut policy. Instead we come up against hesitations, contradictions and unnecessary severity, or, on the other hand, irresponsible behavior which overlooks actual risks. Isn't the great test of a policy precisely its struggle with those problems which seem unalterable? Politics is the art of the possible. When it comes to the subject of the Arab minority in Israel, directed, long-range and daring intervention in both the social and governmental spheres is essential. Such a policy could make integration a reality. ■

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ISRAEL

PROFESSOR DISCUSSES ARAB CITIZENS' POLITICAL POSITIONS

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Oct/Nov 84 pp 26-29

[Interview of Sammy Smooha by Hillel Schenker, date and place not given]

[Text] Dr. Sammy Smooha is chairman of Haifa University's Department of Sociology and Anthropology and head of the "Arabs in Israel" section of the university's Jewish-Arab Center. In the interview published below Smooha contends that Israeli Arabs want to be considered an integral part of the society and must be allowed to enter the arena of legitimate Israeli politics. The problem, argues Smooha, is not with the Arabs, but with the Israeli Jews, who are "unwilling to compromise, unwilling to change."

New Outlook: When the results of your recent survey of Israeli Arab attitudes toward Arab-Jewish relations were published, some of the daily newspapers headlined their stories: "The Majority of Israeli Arabs Do Not Accept the Existence of the State". Yet the impression created by the body of the articles was quite different. What, in fact, were your conclusions?

Sammy Smooha: The basic conclusion of the study was that as time goes by there is a clear tendency among Israeli Arabs to reconcile themselves to the existence of the state and to their status within it as a minority.

N.O.: How is this tendency expressed?

S.S.: First of all, in the self-identification of Israeli Arabs as part of the State of Israel. As the years went by, regardless of whether this process was voluntary or involuntary, Israeli Arabs became Israelis. They became bilingual and bicultural. The average Israeli Arab today has Israeli as well as Arab cultural patterns. If he sits

down to talk with you or me, or takes a trip to the city, he will act just like an Israeli Jew. When he returns to his village, to his home, he acts in accord with the codes of his original, authentic culture. However, the Israeli culture that he has acquired is not just a veneer; it has its own authenticity. It's Israeli.

Perhaps the most significant indication of this reconciliation with Israel is the fact that when an Israeli Arab evaluates himself and his achievements, he compares himself with his Israeli Jewish counterpart. Under no circumstances is he ready to accept comparisons with the Arabs of the West Bank, the Arabs of the Arab states or the Arabs of the Mandate period. When he looks for solutions to his problems, he looks for them within the framework of the Green Line. When he says that he supports the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, he doesn't mean that this is a solution for his problems; it's for the Palestinians, his brothers, his people, but it's not a personal solution.

N.O.: Would a Palestinian state be of importance to him from the point of view of his psychological and national pride?

S.S.: Yes, but as I said it is not a personal solution. In fact, the radicalization of Israeli Arabs stems from the very fact of their reconciliation with their status as a minority within the State of Israel. They say: If I'm here, if I'm stuck here, if my fate is to be a part of the State of Israel, then I want equal treatment. Ironically, it is the very Israelization of the Israeli Arabs that increases the tensions.

N.O.: It creates an increase in expectations and demands.

S.S.: Yes. But these are demands stemming from the feeling that these things are basic, deserved rights. This is not an expression of hostility to the state or disloyalty.

N.O.: Yet during the recent elections we witnessed a phenomenon which, at least on the surface, appears to contradict this thesis. We saw Hadash (Rakah and its allies) retain its numerical strength in the Knesset and we saw the addition of the new Progressive List for Peace. Both of these parties, in the eyes of the Jewish establishment or consensus, are considered beyond the pale as far as the possibility of direct political cooperation is concerned. Logic would seem to indicate that if Israeli Arabs want to have greater influence, to make greater demands, that they should work directly within the existing political power frameworks. How do you explain this contradiction?

S.S.: There is no contradiction here at all. *Rakah (Hadash)* and the Progressive List for Peace accept the existence of the state. In fact, these are the two best possible examples for what I have been saying. There is a huge difference between *Rakah* and *Bnei Hakfar* [“Sons of the Village”, an extreme nationalist group -ed.]. *Bnei Hakfar* rejects the existence of the State of Israel; it's a part of the Rejectionist Front. But even here my thesis is in part reinforced. *Bnei Hakfar* has split into four factions, some of which are moving in the direction of reconciliation with the existence of the

State of Israel. They too see themselves as Israelis. Your comment reflects the degree to which the Jewish side is unwilling to compromise, unwilling to change.

In Israel there is a thesis that Israeli Arabs are undergoing a process of radicalization. Many Israelis, including many orientalists, interpret this radicalization to mean that the Arabs are becoming a hostile, even subversive minority, and that we're heading toward a confrontation with them. This is the position, for example, of Amnon Linn [former head of *Mapai*'s Arab department, who after a number of years in the *Likud*, has returned to the Labor Party -ed.] Eli Rekhess [of Tel Aviv University's *Shiloach* Center -ed.] and others. I disagree. The existence of *Rakah* and the Progressive List for Peace is no indication of extremism. It is the Jews who define it as extremism. My contention is that it is just very difficult for Israeli Jews to change their outlook.

Look at the recent surveys on the attitudes of Israeli youth toward democracy, etc. The responses indicate that Israeli youth find it very difficult to accept Israeli Arabs as a part of Israeli society. This is the problem. *It is hard for the Jews to accept the fact that the Arabs are saying that they want to be accepted as a part of the society.* If the Arabs use all sorts of political means to further their struggle, Israeli Jews ask: What is this? You aren't satisfied? You want to change things? You are becoming extremists? Why is this extremism? As far as I'm concerned, it is not. The fact that you call somebody else an extremist may be a reflection of your own political positions.

N.O.: We see a growing extremism within the Jewish public.

S.S.: Yes. Much of what is considered to be the growing radicalization of Israeli Arabs stems from a growing intolerance among the Jewish public. In fact, we have here two simultaneous processes. On the one hand, the Arabs have changed. They are less ready to resign themselves to their situation than they were in the '50s and '60s. They want to

change the *status quo*, to negotiate new terms of agreement for Israeli society. They want more cooperation, more equality, more respect. They want to be considered an integral part of the society. They are no longer willing to live in a situation of national repression or discrimination. On the other hand, the Jewish public is becoming more extremist and is thus less tolerant of Arabs who make all sorts of protests and demands.

N.O.: This is certainly true for the Israeli Right. But what about the liberal and left-wing elements within the Zionist-Jewish sector of Israeli society? Does the current situation reflect a failure in their basic approach and behavior toward the Arabs?

S.S.: Let me add another element which will help to answer your question. My contention is not that Israeli Jews are intransigent and irrationally opposed to any changes in the situation; they simply do not understand that the Israeli Arabs have reconciled themselves to the State of Israel. The whole problem is extremely complex. Israeli Jews in general, and this includes the Left and liberals, want a Jewish-Zionist state. The question is, how do you define the place of the Arabs within such a state?

N.O.: You can define it as that of a minority with equal civil rights.

S.S.: But what are the limits of those rights? Do Jews have greater rights within a Jewish state? Is the purpose of such a state to serve the needs of the Jews? To maintain Jewish symbols? Will it continue to make special investments in *aliya* (Jewish immigration)? The Left, together with the other segments of the Jewish sector within the state, supports these Zionist goals.

Israeli Arabs have undergone a major change. They have come to accept the existence of the state as a political entity; they accept their place as a minority within the state; they do not want to destroy the state. But at this stage they still are not ready to accept a Zionist state.

Now the Jews are a people who have suffered greatly. It is not enough for them that the Arabs have reconciled themselves to the existence of the state and accept their minority status within it. If the Israeli Arabs do not accept the definition of the state as a Jewish-Zionist state, then as far as the Jews are concerned they are rejecting the state itself. If they don't accept Zionism, then they are potentially disloyal.

Now I don't want anyone to misunderstand what I'm saying. Israel is not a unique phenomenon in the world. Like most states, Israel is an ethnic state. Throughout the entire western world today a problem exists of creating a fair balance between democracy, which is a universal principle

encompassing all the citizens of a state, and the particular ethnic character of the state – in our case, the Jewish-Zionist character of the State of Israel. You have to make certain compromises, and the current compromise in Israel is not a fair one. Israeli Arabs suffer from this compromise. Their struggle is not a challenge to the foundations of the State of Israel; they want to push Israel toward a different compromise. Here we see the difference between the Left – and I'm not referring to the Labor Party – and the rest of the Israeli Jewish public. My general feeling is that *Mapam* and a few other groups are ready to deal with the problem. But the majority, whether we are talking about the Labor party, or certainly the *Likud*, are not. There is a tremendous sense of insecurity.

N.O.: A basic sense of insecurity about Israel's position in the region?

S.S.: That's right. The Israeli-Arab conflict is at the core of the problem. In this context I would like to comment on Ian Lustick's book (which I admire), *Arabs in the Jewish State*. At the end of his study Lustick concludes that relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel are leading toward a confrontation. He contends that the result will be the same whether or not

there is a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If the conflict is not resolved, then the Jews will continue to be suspicious, will continue to oppress etc. If a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the outlook is no better. Why? Because in the wake of such major concessions (giving up the occupied territories in order to establish a Palestinian state), the Jews will want to reinforce the Jewish-Zionist character of the State of Israel. In a situation of peace they will be afraid of Jewish assimilation into the region – a loss of Jewish identity. When confronted with Israeli Arab demands, the Jews will say: Look, we've given you a state; if you're not happy here, why don't you move to the Palestinian state. This, of course, will create a greater sense of alienation.

Lustick makes another interesting claim. He contends that when a Palestinian state is established the Israeli Arabs will say: Look, our brothers are becoming prime ministers, high army

officers, bank executives, industrialists. What have we achieved here? They'll begin to experience what is known as relative deprivation and will become more radical.

I disagree with this entire thesis. I believe that the moment a Palestinian state is established (if one is established), the national aspirations of Israeli Arabs will be satisfied. This will make it easier for them to accept the State of Israel as a Zionist state. There will then be the possibility of normalization because a symmetry will exist between the situations of the two peoples. Secondly, the Jews will then be less suspicious of the Israeli Arabs. The constant fear that they will become a fifth column will be reduced; it will be easier to accept them and to allow them to enter into many areas of Israeli society. I think that the first ones to benefit from a resolution of the conflict will be the Israeli Arabs.

N.O.: It is clear that fundamentally, and in the long run, a political solution to the conflict is necessary in order to overcome the problems. However, in the short run . . .

S.S.: As far as I'm concerned there is no connection. We must change the policy toward Israeli Arabs irrespective of the overall Israeli-Arab conflict. If we wait until the conflict is resolved, we will destroy much of the fabric of our relations.

N.O.: Until now there have been two competing approaches in Israel toward the Israeli Arab problem: the tough, hard-handed approach of Amnon Linn and the more liberal, cooptative approach of Shmuel Toledano [the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs from 1965-1976 -ed.] You are advocating a third approach. What exactly is it?

S.S.: I am proposing an approach based upon the assumption that Israeli Arabs are loyal to the state (whoever isn't loyal should be dealt with on an individual basis), and that, therefore, the system - Israeli society – should be opened up to them. Israeli Arabs should receive more rights, but they should also be confronted with more obligations. For example, I am proposing that Israeli Arabs be allowed to serve in the army. An alternative national service should be instituted at the same time. In the

beginning all this would be on a voluntary, experimental basis so we can see how it works. In this way Arabs would qualify for the status of army graduates, which is very important in Israel. [The lack of such status has been the basis for much of the legal discrimination against Israeli Arabs. MK Muhammad Miari, leader of the Progressive List for Peace, has recently proposed the establishment of national service for Israeli Arabs -ed.]

N.O.: What do you mean by "opening up the system"?

S.S.: Israeli Arabs should be given the opportunity to participate in all spheres of Israeli life. Budgetary discrimination between the Jewish and Arab sectors should be eliminated. For example, Arab villages should be given the same special status and advantages allotted to Jewish development towns. If deprived children in the Jewish schools are given

a special status which involves the channelling of additional funds, children in the Arab schools should enjoy the same status. Project Renewal [the development of disadvantaged neighborhoods in the urban centers -ed.] should be applied to the Arab sector as well. Of course, all of these budgetary allotments would be based upon the standard criteria.

You can't approach Israeli Arabs today and ask them to do military or other national service without granting these other benefits. The moment that Israeli Arabs see that you give them opportunities and regard them as equals, I think they will also accept the fact that they have obligations. Today, of course, the majority of Israeli Arabs would oppose such demands, but if you approach them only with demands, without granting parallel benefits, why should they agree?

N.O.: Israeli Arabs have now experienced seventeen years of direct contact with the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What influence has this had?

S.S.: One thing is unequivocally clear: For Israeli Arabs the Green Line continues to exist and has a formidable reality. Yes, there has been a Palestinianization of Israeli Arabs; they accept the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. But this has not erased the Green Line.

The great difference today between Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the occupied territories is that Israeli Arabs consider themselves to be part of the State of Israel. The generation of Israeli Arabs which has grown up since the establishment of the state has developed into a separate branch of the Palestinian nation, which is composed of many different segments. There is a branch in the West Bank, another in the Gaza Strip, a branch in Jordan; there are refugees in Lebanon, Syria and many other places. There are differences between all these branches, but in my opinion, the Israeli branch is the most distinct, the most separate.

The degree of contact between Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the West Bank should not be exaggerated. There is an

ideological and national affinity, but it is not supported by commercial links, marital ties or daily contact. Israeli Arabs have many more ties with Jews and Israel than they have with the West Bank.

N.O.: What in your opinion is the degree of urgency that the Israeli Arab issue poses for Israeli society? If immediate steps are not taken, will we soon be facing a growing cycle of frustration, embitterment and extremism?

S.S.: We are not facing the same kind of situation that is facing the Israeli economy. Social processes do not explode from one day to the next.

However, we face a number of burning problems and they must be dealt with the sooner the better. The change must take place among the Jews, and in the order of things, the next step must be taken by them, particularly the Jewish establishment. If this change comes about, I think the Arabs would be willing to take that additional step of accepting the State of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state.

N.O.: Are there any specific steps that you would like to propose?

S.S.: There are two steps that I see as essential for any possible change: The first is that an Israeli Arab party must be established. The Progressive List for Peace is an important start in this direction. It is the first Israeli party dominated by Arabs (unlike Rakah). I think the role of the Jews will decrease even further in time and that the Progressive List will eventually become an Arab party. The second step necessary for change concerns the question of military or national service. An arrangement must be worked out that enables the Arabs to qualify for the status of army graduates. Achievement of this status will enable Israeli Arabs to become a legitimate pressure group within Israeli society. Today whenever the Arabs struggle for something they are told: You don't serve in the army; you're not loyal. The moment they gain this status they will gain legitimization.

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An Arab party will provide them with the necessary leadership and will be able to negotiate on their behalf. I am talking about an Arab party which will be taken into consideration as an active coalition partner in a future government.

N.O.: In the negotiations that preceded the formation of the present national unity government, Hadash and the Progressive List for Peace were ruled out of any coalition considerations despite the great need for their additional numbers.

S.S.: A party on the periphery like Rakah can't bring about any changes. All it achieves is greater alienation and isolation. For Arabs to have direct

influence they must be represented by a party that can be taken into account. They will gain this "political clout" when they have achieved the status of having completed their military or an equivalent national service. The real issue here is that Israeli Arabs must enter the arena of legitimate Israeli politics. Look, the Arabs could be a stronger pressure group than *Agudat Yisrael*. There could be a respectable Arab minister who was not a member of the Labor party.

N.O.: Of course, theoretically, such a minister could be a member of Mapam or even the Labor Party.

S.S.: Theoretically.

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ISRAEL

POPULATION STATISTICS GIVEN FOR ARAB INHABITANTS

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[Article by Avraham Cohen]

[Avraham Cohen has authored several books on the economic problems of Israel and the Arab world. The following article, which provides basic demographic information about Israel's Arab population including developments over the last 30 years and forecasts for the future, is excerpted from a larger economic study by Cohen published by the Givat Haviva Institute for Arabic Studies. It should be noted that while Cohen bases his data on the 1982 Israel Statistical Annual which includes East Jerusalem in its calculations, the vast majority of East Jerusalem Arabs do not regard themselves as an integral part of the State of Israel.]

Today, the Arabs of Israel (including East Jerusalem Arabs) constitute about 16% of the population of the state. Between 1950 and 1965 – before the annexation of East Jerusalem – they had numbered a consistent 12% of the population. The annual growth rate from 1950-1980 was close to 4% for the Arabs within the Green Line. This growth process was quite steady, averaging about a 20% increase every five years.

The Israeli Arab population is scattered among different regions, with no territorial continuity or economic ties between the different communities. This dispersion is primarily the result of various political events: Jewish settlement during the Mandatory period, the War of Independence, the armistice agreements with Jordan in 1949, and most recently the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967.

The main population blocs are: East Jerusalem; the Negev Beduin; the Arab

inhabitants of the mixed cities of Lydda, Ramle, Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre; the villages and towns along the eastern border (known as the Little Triangle) that were annexed following the armistice agreements in 1949; and finally, the large and concentrated Arab population of the Central Galilee.

EAST JERUSALEM

The East Jerusalem Arab population, while formally classified as "Israeli Arab" (since 1967), in actuality and from almost every point of view, continues to remain an integral part of the economic and social system of the West Bank. As the largest urban concentration, East Jerusalem constitutes a market for agricultural goods produced in the area between Ramallah and Bethlehem, as well as providing services, small-craft and industrial goods, culture and entertainment. In addition, East Jerusalem constitutes a religious and political center for the West Bank; it is the seat of the

THE DIVISION OF THE ARABS OF ISRAEL ACCORDING TO REGIONS: 1980

Bloc	Thousands	Percentage
East Jerusalem	115	18
Negev Beduin	49	8
Mixed Cities	46	7
The Little Triangle, etc.	130	20
The Central Galilee	299	47
Total	639	100

Supreme Moslem Council and all the West Bank newspapers are published in East Jerusalem. In contrast, there is no territorial continuity between East Jerusalem and the major concentrations of Israeli Arabs, and there are virtually no economic ties between the two populations.

THE NEGEV BEDUIN

The Negev Beduin constitute another special category. This population grew from 13,500 in 1951 to close to 50,000 in 1980 – a 4.5% average accumulated annual growth rate. Nevertheless, the percentage of Beduin within the overall Negev population (what is called the Beer-Sheba region) has dropped from 37% to 18%. The problems of the Beduin are different from those of Israeli Arabs in other areas of the state and they have almost no economic ties with these other areas. Their urban center is Beer-Sheba with its "Beduin Market".

MIXED CITIES

The Arab population of the mixed cities is the only population which did not keep apace with the general rate of increase, registering only a 50% growth between 1950-1980. As a result, its proportional standing decreased from 18% of the population of these cities in 1950 to 7% in 1980. In general, this population comprises a small minority

within the various cities and has no system of reciprocal relations or economic ties with any of the Arab villages in the area.

The largest group within this population – some 16,000 persons – lives in

Haifa and constitutes about 7% of the overall population of the city, a significant decrease since 1950. The Arab population of Acre constitutes about 24% of the city's overall population; in Lydda and Ramle about 15%; and in Tel Aviv/Jaffa a mere 2.5%.

At this point, the lag in the general process of urbanization among Israeli Arabs should be noted. In 1950, about 30% of the Arab population of Israel were urbanites. In 1980, they numbered only about 17% of the Arab population within the Green Line. Only if residents of East Jerusalem are included, does the percentage rise to 32%. In contrast, there is not a single Arab country other than Sudan whose level of urbanization is not above 40% (in Egypt it is 45%, Jordan 56%, Lebanon 76%, Iraq 72% and in Syria 50%). The level of urbanization in Israel as a whole has reached 89%.

THE LITTLE TRIANGLE AND "ISOLATED" VILLAGES

In accord with the 1949 armistice agreements with Jordan, a number of villages, constituting a long and narrow strip along the eastern border, were added to Israeli territory and included within the Green Line. While these villages of the Little Triangle have some degree of territorial continuity, they do not form a regional network from an economic point of view; they share no mutual urban center, and instead are "linked" to the cities closest to them: Petah Tikvah, Kfar Saba, Netanya, Haifa and Afula. The same general situation applies to the "isolated" villages outside the Little Triangle which belong to no

THE ARAB POPULATION OF THE MIXED CITIES: 1950-1980 (end of year statistics in thousands)

CITY	1950	1980	PERCENTAGE OF GROWTH	% OF OVERALL CITY POPULATION 1950	% OF OVERALL CITY POPULATION 1980
Haifa	18	16	-11	13	7
Acre	4	9.2	128	33	24
Tel Aviv/Jaffa	5	8.4	68	1.5	2.5
Ramle	1.8	6.2	244	14	15
Lydda	1.1	5.9	436	9	15
Total	29.9	45.7	53	—	—

regional constellation: for example, Abu Ghosh in the Judean Hills, Jiljulieh in the Sharon, Faradis near Zichron Ya'akov, Daliat El-Carmel and Usafiyeh near Haifa, etc.

The overall population of the thirty-six Triangle and "isolated" villages is 140,000. The vast majority (some 120,000) are concentrated in the larger villages with populations exceeding 2,000. Since 1951 (when the population of these villages numbered only 35,000), these villages have registered an annual growth rate of 4.3%.

THE CENTRAL GALILEE

The only Arab population bloc in Israel that approaches the status of "territorial minority" is the Arab population of the Central Galilee. This bloc consists of some sixty villages and a dozen Beduin tribes; there is almost complete territorial continuity, an urban center in Nazareth and a secondary center in Shfaram. In 1951 the Arab

population of this region numbered about 80,000; by the end of 1980, the population had reached approximately 290,000 - that is, more than a threefold increase.

POPULATION OF THE LITTLE TRIANGLE AND "ISOLATED" VILLAGES:
1951-1980

(end of year statistics in thousands)

Village	1951	1980
Abu Ghosh	0.9	2.5
Kfar Kassam	1.7	7.1
Jiljulieh	1.1	3.3
Tira	3.8	10.8
Taiba	5.3	16.3
Kalansawa	1.9	7.3
Baka El-Garbiyeh	3.3	10.5
Jat	1.5	4.4
Umm El-Fahm	5.2	19.3
Kfar Kara	1.9	6.9
Ara	1.1	2.3
Arara	1.4	5.6
Jisr Al-Zarka	?	4.6
Faradis	1.1	4.9
Daliat El-Carmel	2.8	5.8
Usafiyeh	2.0	5.8
Total	34.7	119.8

This concentrated Arab population in the Central Galilee has almost no economic ties with Israeli Arabs from other regions. To the south, it is separated from the Little Triangle by the Jezreel Valley. To the east it is surrounded by blocs of Jewish settlement in the Jordan Valley, the Hula Valley and what is called *Etzba Hagalil* (the finger of the Galilee). To the north lie the Lebanese border and the thin chain of border settlements. The Zevulun Valley settlements, Nahariyah etc., flank it to the west.

The Jewish settlements in the Central Galilee region do not impinge upon the general Arab character of the area. At the end of 1980, the population of Upper Nazareth (established in 1957) numbered 23,000 and Carmiel (1964)

13,000. If we include Safed (16,000), which is at the eastern end of the region, and Ma'alon (5,000), we arrive at an urban Jewish population of approximately 57,000.

The eight kibbutzim, eight moshavim and one collective moshav in the area have a total population of 5,000. They are territorially discontinuous from Upper Nazareth and Carmiel and form no economic unit with these cities. In the last few years, twenty odd "out-posts" have been established in the Central Galilee, but till now, none have deviated from this narrow framework and their entire population does not exceed a few hundred.

More than a third of the Central Galilee Arabs live in settlements with populations over 5,000. This is in addition to the nearly 60,000 who live in the cities of Nazareth and Shfaram. An additional 75,000 live in large villages with populations exceeding 2,000. Only 40% of Central Galilee Arabs live in villages with populations under 2,000 – that is, less than 15% of the overall population.

**ARAB VILLAGES IN THE CENTRAL GALILEE WITH POPULATIONS EXCEEDING 5,000 INHABITANTS
(end of year statistics in thousands)**

Settlement	1951	1980
Tamra	3.6	12.3
Sachnin	3.8	11.8
Majar	3.0	9.2
Araba	2.5	9.0
Kfar Cana	2.6	7.5
Yifyeh	1.6	7.0
Yirka	2.1	6.0
Majd Al-Khrum	2.3	6.0
Kfar Manda	1.5	6.0
Rina	?	5.6
Taran	1.6	5.4
Ichsel	0.8	5.3
Iblin	1.6	5.3
Abu Snan	1.4	5.3
Kfar Yasif	1.9	5.3
Beit Jan	1.8	5.2
Total	32.1	112.2

DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

During the thirty year period under examination (1950-1980), the Arab population of Israel has undergone what is known as a "population explosion". This is primarily due to a drastic reduction in the mortality rate (as a result of the operation of Israeli health services) with no significant reduction in the birth rate. This is particularly true for the Moslem population, which constitutes 85% of the Israeli Arab population. The mortality rate (per thousand) among Moslems in Israel declined from 15.9 in 1946 to 4.2 in 1980, a mortality rate almost unequalled even in the most developed countries. (The mortality rate among Christians in Israel in 1980 was 6.0, and among Jews, 7.2).

While the mortality rate among Moslems was thus decreasing, the reproductive rate among Moslem women increased between 1950-1970, only beginning to drop in 1975. In 1980, the reproductive rate among the Moslem population was

still double that of the Jewish population. In contrast, the reproductive rate among the Christian population was almost identical to that of the Jewish population for the period between 1970-1980.

As a result of this population explosion, the gap between the average ages of Israeli Arabs and Jews has widened. In 1980 the median age of Israeli Arabs was sixteen, while the median age of Israeli Jews was twenty-seven. A second result of this process is an increase in the proportion of large families, with seven or more members among the Arab population. They increased from 37% of the population in 1960 to 47% in 1977 (there was a decrease to 44% in 1980). Among Israeli Jews, large families decreased from 9% of the population in 1960 to approximately 6% in 1980.

FORECAST

The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has published a forecast of the projected growth of the Arab population in Israel for the years 1980-2000:

Concerning the more distant future, estimates of international institutions studying population movements are available. According to these estimates, there is a tendency toward a decline in the rate of population turnover. In the Middle East, the turnover rate will decline to approximately 1.0 by the year 2020, and we can expect a complete stabilization of population in the region by the 80's of the next century (It will reach Egypt and Syria by 2080, Jordan by 2085, and Iran by 2090. Only Lebanon and Tunisia will reach stabilization by 2070). The size of the population when it stabilizes will be about four times the 1980 population. If we accept this forecast for Israeli Arabs as well, we can estimate that their numbers will reach approximately 2.5 million in another century. Their overall weight within the general population is, of course, dependent upon the balance of immigration for the Jewish population during the same period. ■

Year	Moslems	Christians	Druse & Others	Total	Percentage of General Population
1980	498	90	51	639	16
1985	603	96	61	760	18
1990	721	105	73	899	19
1995	853	113	73	1,052	21
2000	993	121	99	1,213	23

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

KARIM KHALAF DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN SPLIT

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Dec 84 pp 47-48

[Interview with Karim Khalaf, former mayor of Ramallah, place and date not specified]

[Text] Karim Khalaf is one of the most prominent Palestinian national personalities in the occupied land; in fact, he is one of the architects of the Palestinian position. He is the elected mayor of the town of Ramallah, removed by the occupation authorities, and repeated assassination attempts have not stopped him from continuing to fight for the freedom of his people.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI interviewed him on the issue and its future following the latest convening of the Palestine National Council. The talk went beyond details into the heart of the matter, and centered in particular on the occupation and matters concerning the interior [of the homeland].

[Question] After 17 years of occupation, how do you view the future?

[Answer] Seventeen years of occupation have not been able to stop our people's struggle. In 17 years we have accomplished much, despite the fact that the struggle goes on under less than ideal circumstances, in the midst of campaigns of oppression and violent terrorism. But the practices of the occupation, which are numerous and cover all aspects of life, will not turn aside our determination, and we will continue to fight the taking away of our rights. There is continuous settlement and the endless seizure of lands, escalating campaigns of arrests and successive military orders. But the harsher these practices get the more we hang onto our rights. You can ask every man, woman, elderly person or child in this land about his position and his morale. Spirits are high, and the position is that of one who has right on his side. True, there is much impotence and decline on the Arab scene, but we will not despair. We will press on, under the banner of the PLO, in order to bring an end to the impotence and decline, and we will continue with our struggle until our Arab brothers arise. The Zionist danger does not threaten us alone. It threatens all Arab people, and the Arab nation, but unfortunately our Arab brothers have not yet realized that fact. Some of our brothers are attacking our struggle, but we say, "God forgive them! Yes, with bitterness, God forgive them." As a Palestinian living under the occupation, I see shocking things

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done by my people. But I have not lost my optimism, and the future lies ahead. True, the occupation is trying to force us to our knees and is determined to liquidate our cause and even to force us to emigrate, and some of our brothers are even trying to remove the smiles from our faces, but we are a people experienced with struggling and armed with hope and faith. Such is our fate, and we must combat every attempt from whatever quarter to liquidate and vanquish us.

[Question] It is said that there are splits in the Palestinian arena, here in the interior, with respect to the PLO.

[Answer] That is not said at all. Here we are the people of the PLO, the people and masses of legitimacy. We all support our leaders under the leadership of Yasir 'Arafat. There is no quarrel over that; some are trying to sow discord among us, but we are a discerning people that knows where its interests lie and we are capable of distinguishing fat from thin. The latest events are the greatest proof of that. There is no division among us, but some are trying to export it to us. But the goods are not in demand, and we will not accept them.

[Question] Are there differences among the Palestinian groups, and have these differences been reflected in the interior?

[Answer] The interior, as I have said, is with its legitimate leadership. But let me make clear to you that there are several opinions on certain questions, but the opinion that emerges from the Palestinian grass-roots is that which has the support of the masses, and these masses have great confidence in 'Arafat's leadership, and so there is no need for differences, and everyone should go along with what the majority decides.

[Question] What is the role of certain Arab parties in the crisis in the Palestinian arena?

[Answer] I have said that some of our brothers are trying to wipe the smiles off of the faces of our people's children, but that is impossible; there is no crisis in the Palestinian arena in the sense of a crisis. The crisis is between the PLO and the Syrian regime, which wants to subjugate our independent national decision-making to its interests. When we began our journey we did not get permission from anyone, and we did not knock on rulers' doors. Our decision-making will remain independent, while preserving the Arab dimension. Some of our brothers in the Palestinian arena have given in to various circumstances for various reasons. We are sorry for that, and we will work to mend relations with Damascus, but within a framework that will preserve the independence of our decision-making and our rights and not touch our leadership, that leadership which the people selected and supports.

[Question] It is said that when the crisis began, you were on the Palestinian side allied with the Syrian regime.

[Answer] My position has been clear from the beginning and it has not changed. I am on the side of Palestinian legitimacy headed by my brother 'Arafat. I strongly rejected the criticisms that were directed against him when he visited

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Cairo while on his way out of Tripoli following his forced departure on account of the twofold Israeli-Syrian blockade. And I strongly rejected the demand by some that Brother Abu 'Ammar be removed, because they did not have the right to do so. That would be a gross violation of our rights. I am on the side of legitimacy, and I have said that whoever wants our people must support this legitimacy which we, the sons of that Palestinian people, have chosen. We have asked our Palestinian brothers to hold discussions and to preserve national unity, and we welcomed the Aden-Algiers agreement and viewed it as a sound and appropriate basis for strengthening national unity. We demanded that all demands and opinions within the National Council be discussed. We said that whoever demands that 'Arafat be removed should come to the National Council. We demanded that the National Council convene anywhere. It was decided that the council would convene on 15 September after it had been postponed several times, but some of our brothers rejected that and talk went on until the middle of the following month. But the legitimate leadership responded to the determination by these brothers to postpone it with a decisive decision--to hold the council in Amman--after the Arab world put pressure on our brothers, the members of the National Council. Here, I assure you that getting Palestinian institutions back in operation was a national duty, and the National Council had to be held. The Palestinian arena is experiencing developments that can only be decided by the council. To preserve national unity, in a letter which I wrote to Yasir 'Arafat through the pages of the magazine AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI issued in Jerusalem, I asked that the National Council be postponed for a short but definite period of time, on condition that the Executive Committee would eventually be called to a meeting. I begged our Palestinian brothers to attend the committee's meeting, and in my letter I said, "This is the last chance, and if they do not attend, let the National Council be convened without them," and that is what happened. Palestinian institutions cannot remain frozen to please one side or another. The masses have a claim on these institutions, which everyone must respect. This has been my viewpoint from the beginning. I was for holding the Palestine National Council, while talk in the Palestinian arena still had not reached a conclusion with respect to this matter, so 'Arafat had to call for the council to fulfill the wishes of the people. And that is what happened. The Council was held and the 17th session was a success. I sent a telegram to the National Council with my vote, in which I confirmed my support of the council and the leadership of Abu 'Ammar.

[Question] But there is opposition within the occupied land to holding the council?

[Answer] The course of any people is not devoid of opposition, but I assure you that the great majority in the occupied territories are for holding the National Council and for Brother Yasir 'Arafat's leadership; this is clear to everyone. I assure you that this leadership will continue to work to establish national unity and to resume the dialogue with our comrades of the road.

[Question] The opposition says that 'Arafat is moving towards solutions of America's making, and that along with Arab parties he is headed towards accepting these solutions.

[Answer] The American solutions that did not include the rights of our people were rejected by the leadership and the masses. A number of solutions have

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been presented, but we rejected them because they do not include these rights, foremost of which is the right of our people to self-determination. Those suggestions are devoid of truth, and here you have the resolutions of the 17th session which reaffirm the strength of 'Arafat's leadership and its refusal to accept any compromise solutions. We have been hearing this chatter for many years, but what has come of it and why hasn't Abu 'Ammar stepped down? I say enough recrimination. As for Jordan, our people have a special relationship with it, and the danger threatens both the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. Coordination with Jordan must continue, to arrive at a joint position and a joint formula for action that preserves our rights. Jordan hosted the session of the National Council, a position which we appreciate, and we listened to King Husayn's speech in which he reaffirmed the right of our people to self-determination and his support of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. As for Egypt, no-one denies its power, position and influence. I would say that attacks against us increased in severity after Egypt left the battlefield, so why shouldn't the Palestinian leadership take on the duty of returning Egypt to the Arab fold? Does this duty mean withdrawal, retreat, and surrender? May God forgive all who oppose this Palestinian role in returning Egypt to the battlefield.

[Question] The Gulf war has gone on for more than 5 years. What is your view of this war, and what is its effect on events, and on the Palestinian question in particular?

[Answer] This insane war must end. Iraq has sacrificed a lot for the Palestinian cause, and it must get back its capabilities to serve and defend this cause. I implore Iran to end this war, and I salute the Iraqi leadership headed by Saddam Husayn for its clear position represented by its readiness to end the fighting. I believe that the Arabs' taking a unified position towards this war would force Iran to drop its obstinacy. Let the capabilities of the two countries (Iran and Iraq) be diverted to the field of the real battle. I will not hide the fact that the continuing escalation of the fighting by Iran serves Israeli Zionist plans which aim to distract Iraq from its role and duty. Those Arab countries which support Iran are striking at the Palestinian cause and its people, and at all Arab peoples and the Iranian people as well.

[Question] Do you believe there is a political solution to the Palestinian problem on the horizon?

[Answer] I believe there is intense political activity in that direction. However, any settlement plan which does not include the rights of the Palestinian people is not destined to succeed. A political solution requires Arab strength, but unfortunately the Arab scene is impotent, and some of our Arab brothers are even fighting us. I believe that what we need now is for a unified Arab stance to be implemented supportive of the Palestinian position, for it to be taken to the international arena, and for an international conference to be called that will include the parties to the conflict, including

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the PLO. I call on the PLO to develop and continue coordination with Jordan and not to allow a new map of the area to be drafted at the expense of our people.

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AFGHANISTAN

SOVIETS COUNT ON TIME, LASSITUDE TO BRING DOWN RESISTANCE

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 4-10 Jan 85 pp 36-37

[Article by Jean-Pierre Perrin: "Standing Up to the Red Army"]

[Text] On December 27, 1979, 90,000 Soviet soldiers invaded Afghanistan. Five years later, the Red Army still has not succeeded in subduing the Mujahidin, the "faith fighters", despite the hunger, lack of weapons and fragmentation of the resistance. The United States, but also France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, have reiterated their demand for a halt to Soviet occupation. There is little chance, however, that international censure will influence Moscow to revise its strategy. Particularly since, in this dirty war, the USSR is counting on time and lassitude.

Jean-Pierre Perrin, a French journalist, has just completed his fourth account with the Afghan resistance. For 5 weeks, from October to November 1984, he traveled with them through the Hazarajat and Qandahar regions. Here is his eyewitness account.

It was once the capital of the first great Moslem kingdom founded on Afghan soil. The sultan Mahmoud ravaged India and raided Ghazni of its spoils . . . Today, the suburbs of this proud metropolis have been reduced to an immense, desolate terrain: dozens of war-shattered villages, helicopters in search of prey, a steady stream of bombs walling off the horizon. There are children also, tending herds in the steppe, and guerrillas stealing in and out among the ruins. In Ghazni (fifth largest city in Afghanistan, 300 kilometers from the Pakistan border), life and death have kept a close watch on each other for 5 years now. Flattened against the roof of a gutted house, we observe the air base: mammoth combat helicopters are landing. But our position is too exposed - we are spotted! And the shells begin to rain down. The group breaks up. The commander and three men armed with rocket-launchers crawl toward a Soviet artillery installation. The seven other Mujahidin take shelter in a ruin bordering the trails, powerful projectiles pursue us. All breathing stops - a few, very long, seconds. Then the light fades in the distance. The guerrillas fire three rockets - half their ammunition - then withdraw. A Soviet artillery scrawls a fearsome response across the blackened sky.

Nearly every evening, the rebels launch a lightning raid against the city or airport. Then they regroup in their mountains. Each party has a base, hidden at the bottom of a gorge. The dominant organization is the Harakat, about 1,500 men strong. Only yesterday, the Hezb-e Islami: (the Islamic Party), the most sectarian of the Afghan fundamentalist parties, held the predominant position, thanks to the personality of its young chief. In 1983, the latter received an order to go fight another faction based in the center of the country. The reason? There is one inviolable rule within the resistance: any Mujahidin can change political parties provided he leave his weapons behind him. Some Hezb soldiers had violated this law; war was inevitable. Last year it caused 1,700 deaths, according to the resistance. A tragedy which illustrates the two major weaknesses of the guerrilla forces: lack of weapons and internal divisions.

According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, 625 million dollars in American military aid was donated to the resistance from 1979 to 1984. Yet Mas'ud, the brilliant commander-in-chief of Panjshir, complains constantly of the shortage of weapons. Amin Wardak, from the province of the same name, states that he receives only 10 percent of his ammunition from Pakistan. One thing is certain: with 80 percent of Soviet military operations air-based, the Mujahidin are almost totally without heavy artillery and effective anti-aircraft weapons. What, then, becomes of Uncle Sam's aid? First of all, since the United States refuses to deliver American materiel, it goes for the purchase of Soviet-manufactured weapons - at exorbitant prices - from Egypt, Israel, etc. Then, some of the weapons, particularly the most sophisticated, are diverted. Despite its denials, Pakistan helps itself. Although Pakistan supports the resistance, it also keeps it under close surveillance to forestall any real progress. This is important for reasons of internal politics alone: the risk of a "Lebanonization" of the country by Afghans (3 million refugees) is a recurrent nightmare for Islamabad's leaders. Furthermore, the Soviets could set off pockets of rebellion among the Baluchis and Pashtuns, whose leaders have declared themselves pro-Soviet. In 1984, the Red Army stepped up pressure along the Pakistan borders. While air attacks killed only 13 people during the first 4 years of the conflict, they caused 75 deaths in the month of August alone.

One man, in any case, has no reason to complain. He receives weapons from all the factions, with the exception of the Hezb-e Islami. At 33, Abdul Raziq is a remarkable combat leader. His base, located not far from Qandahar (the second largest city in Afghanistan) is a model of its kind. It is made up of underground shelters, defended by 15 or so heavy machine guns. Eight hundred fifty soldiers, trained and disciplined, regularly attack the strategic Kabul-Qandahar axis. They have turned it into a tank cemetery! The route is rigorously controlled by small mobile units, under the command of an officer. Mohammed Khan's unit is almost impossible to find in the mountain. "When we carry out an ambush", he confides, "we usually have only a few wounded. Occasionally, the tide turns against us. Then we may have as many as 30 "martyrs".

Abdul Raziq is also an "alem" (religious doctor) and as such embodies the traditional Afghan clergy's response to the upsurge of young Islamic fighters, of whom Mas'ad is the symbol. Because they have a thoroughly modern guerrilla approach, the Islamic commanders have to some extent relegated the traditional religious to the background. This is why the communist government is attempting to co-opt the latter - there is an oulema council loyal to the regime - arguing that their function is threatened by the emergence of young lay Islamic leaders.

Though the resistance in the Qandahar province appears effective, it seems quite fragile in Hazarajat, in the center of the country. It was dominated for several years by the Jhura, which combined the conservative Shi'ite clergy and the region's agrarian landlords. Little by little, small pro-Iranian factions took root, armed and supported by Tehran. The inevitable confrontations between the two camps took the lives of thousands of victims. The ayatollah Behechti, leader of the Jhura, was forced to abandon its capital, Behsud, and take refuge at commander Sayyed Jaglan's, on the outskirts of the province. Each faction claims allegiance to Khomeyni and spouts the same slogans. Thus, the United States are considered the "number one enemy" of the Afghan people! At the same time, the Kabul regime seems to be offering a hand to the defeated party, the Jhura, through the Mother Country Front, an organization which attempts to rally ethnic and religious minorities threatened by the rising star of the Mujahidin. For its part, Iran has succeeded in establishing a bulkhead in Afghanistan, from which it plans to export "its" Islamic revolution.

Toward a Hundred Years War?

And the USSR? In 1984, the Red Army considerably stepped up its involvement in Afghanistan. Its personnel is calculated at more than 150,000 men. This estimation is based on Moscow's capability of carrying out several front-line offensives in very distant provinces. Moreover, it is utilizing TU-16 heavy bombers, whose goal is to methodically carve out a set perimeter . . . using 500 kilo bombs.

At the same time, Soviet bases have increased in both size and number today, the base strategically located at Shindand (to the west, 800 kilometers from the strait of Ormuz) covers an area 10 times greater than the former Afghan base, in a region where resistance is virtually non-existent. Finally, the Soviet army is mounting counter-guerrilla operations, backed up by elite units: this is a new strategy, since up until 1983, it limited its control to large cities and principal routes.

The USSR is more than ever determined to crush the resistance. Overall, the rebels have lost little ground. Their morale is intact. Are they wrong to claim they are preparing to wage a hundred years war?

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IRAN

EFFORTS EXERTED BY REGIME FOR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH USSR

London FOREIGN REPORT in English 25 Jan 85 pp 2-3

[Text] Iran and the Soviet Union have been quick to react to the deal by which Iraq will obtain American arms to fight the Gulf war (Foreign Report January 10th). Iran's deputy foreign minister, Hossein Shikhol Islam Zadeh, whose visits to Damascus over the past two years have uncannily preceded several big terrorist operations turned up in the Syrian capital last week. He gave Syria's President Hafez Assad a request from Ayatollah Khomeini: would Assad help bring about a rapprochement between Iran and the Soviet Union?

Assad sent the request to Moscow. On January 21st Zadeh flew back to Damascus for talks with a Soviet delegation led by Akal Valimov, a member of the Supreme Soviet and deputy chairman of the Uzbekistan council of ministers. According to our Middle Eastern sources, they discussed possible sales of Soviet arms to Iran; better Soviet-Iranian relations; and their differences over Afghanistan. Iran was asked to provide a detailed list of the arms needed. The list was to be sent to Moscow; there were no promises.

On the question of better relations, the Russians grumbled that Iranian revolutionary guards had been infiltrating neighbouring Afghanistan to build up the local Shiite underground, the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. In the past two months, Iran has set up frontier bases in Mashhad, in the north, where Ahmad Hossein set up his headquarters and training camp, and Zahedan, near the Iran-Afghan-Pakistani border junction in the south. The revolutionary guards and Shiite guerrillas use the two bases to infiltrate Afghanistan's Herat province and set up Shiite cells in its villages. A month ago, Afghan troops guarding the border districts were replaced by four brigades of 6,000 Soviet paratroops in the north and two brigades of 3,000 paratroops in the south.

Soviet officers were also sent to the last meeting in December of the Iranian-Afghan mixed military commission, which meets monthly at the border town of Tayyebat to clear up border problems. When it became clear that the only Afghan present was a captain acting as interpreter, the Iranians walked out. No date was set for a January meeting. Valimov told Zadeh in Damascus that the commission's meetings must resume.

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He also said that the revolutionary guards must be stopped from sneaking into Afghanistan and that Ahmad Hossein's operations must be brought to an end. There were other Soviet demands: Iran must stop attacking the Soviet Union in its foreign-language broadcasts and ban anti-Soviet demonstrations. It must improve the living conditions of jailed members of the Tudeh (communist) party and resume natural gas sales to the Soviet Union. Iran's response is not known.

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IRAN

REGIME PLANS TO LEVY TAXES DESPIRE BAZAAR'S OPPOSITION

London FOREIGN REPORT in English 25 Jan 85 pp 3-4

[Text]

A theological dispute about the economics of a fundamentalist Moslem state is dividing the clergy in Iran just when the government of **Ayatollah Khomeini** is desperately trying to find new funds to make up for the shortfall in oil revenues. The prime minister, **Hussein Moussavi**, wants to raise taxes to increase the government's reserves; but his plans are being opposed by conservative religious leaders who say the taxes are un-Islamic.

The issue has become particularly pressing in the past few weeks as attacks on tankers around Kharg Island and the low world demand for oil have reduced Iran's oil exports to below one million barrels a day—about half its Opec quota. Apart from providing foreign exchange, oil revenues are also a source of government revenue, along with customs duties and income and corporate taxes. Only government employees are taxed efficiently.

Moussavi wants to increase taxes on businesses, which at present pay about a third of government employees' taxes. The biggest group of businessmen is, however, made up of the bazaar traders, who funded the opposition to the **Shah** and do not like to pay taxes. This group is closely allied to the conservative clergy, who argue that only Islamic taxes like zakat (2½% of income and capital per year) and khums (20% of trading profits) should be payable.

A bill to raise ordinary taxes has had its first reading in parliament but could still be rejected by the council of guardians, the 12 senior clerics who can veto legislation if they think it is un-Islamic. This group has already vetoed three economic reforms. One of the spiritual leaders of the group is the **Grand Ayatollah Muhammad-Reza Golpayegani**, who lives in Qom and ranks above Khomeini in the religious hierarchy. Another is **Ayatollah Hassan Qomi-Tabatabai** in the north-eastern Iranian city of Mashhad.

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In Qom, Khomeini's home town, theological students have been handing out leaflets opposing the measures. **President Ali Khamenei** was embarrassed in an interview by a question about the incident and evaded a direct answer. Khomeini has remained aloof, steering a course between opposing groups of supporters. But his regime has been taking action to curb the debate: **Ayatollah Ali Meshgini**, a firm Khomeini supporter, has been urging discipline in the theological colleges of Qom; Tabatabai was put under house arrest in Mashhad last month and two of his sons were jailed.

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